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1. INTRODUCTION
Over hundreds ofvears and in relative isolation, Native Hawaiians developed
a complex society and subsistence economy based on their relationship
with the gods and the natural world. Prior to Hawai'i's first written laws,
Hawaiian custom and usage regulated Hawaiian life.' Thus. Hawaiian
customary practices, particularly those related to land, have been recognised
and incorporated into Hawai'i's statutory law since the earliest formal written
laws in 1839. During the reign of Kamehameha 111, the Kingdom of Hawai'i
developed written laws that included protections for ancient custom and
usage.2 These laws survived political transitions and continue to apply as
underlying principles of property law in Hawai'i. Of equal importance is that
modem Hawaiians continue traditional practices and usage. As one scholar
notes, today there are "customs and practices related to each major aspect of
Hawaiian lifestyle and livelihood. including family, community life, human
well-being and spirituality, natural environment, cultural and ecological
resources, rights, and economics".3
In 1978, the Hawai'i State Constitution was amended to specifically recognise
traditional and customary Hawaiian practices by adopting Article XII, Section
7:4
1 John Ricord, Preface to [18461 1 Statute Laws of His Majesty Kamehameha III, King of
the Hawaiian Islands 3 ("[1846] 1 King. Haw. Laws") (stating that "the Hawaiian kingdom
was governed until the year 1838, without other system than usage, and with a few trifling
exceptions, without legal enactments"), cited in Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v Hawai'i
County Planning Comm'n ("P4SH"), 79 Hawai'i 425, 437 n. 21 903 P.2d 1246. 1258 n.
21 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1163 (1996).
2 See, PASH, 79 Hawai'i, at442-47, 903 P.2d at 1263-68 (tracing the development of private
property rights in Hawai'i).
3 Davianna Pomaika'i McGregor "An Introduction to the Hoa'aina and Their Rights" (1996)
30 Haw J of Hist I at 3.
4 Haw. Const. art. XII, § 7.
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Traditional and Customary Rights
Section 7. The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and
traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and
possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who
inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State
to regulate such rights.
In deliberations on this provision, the constitutional framers recognised that
Native Hawaiian "sustenance, religious and cultural practices ... are an integral
part of their culture, tradition and heritage, with such practices forming the
basis of Hawaiian identity and value systems", and viewed the amendment as
a vehicle to "preserve the small remaining vestiges of a quickly disappearing
culture [by providing] a legal means by constitutional amendment to recognize
and reaffirm native Hawaiian rights".6
In a series of cases beginning in 1982, the Hawaii Supreme Court has
interpreted this section and other statutory provisions to allow access by Native
Hawaiian cultural practitioners to undeveloped or less than fully developed
lands in order to exercise traditional and customary rights. The Court has also
imposed a duty on public agencies to assess and protect to the extent feasible
such rights when issuing development permits. Nevertheless, many open
questions remain about the reach and extent of the amendment - who can
exercise these rights, on what kinds of property, what kind of state regulation
is appropriate, and what are the responsibilities of government agencies in
regulating development that impacts traditional and customary rights?
This paper explores the historical roots of Hawai'i's recognition of traditional
and customary practices related to land and natural resources and the
development of custom in modern times through Hawai'i case law. It also
presents a brief overview of three other areas of law in which Native Hawaiian
customs have been recognised and incorporated into State legislation. The
paper concludes with an Oli Aloha or chant expressing the values of Aloha.
This oli, which has been adopted into State law, seeks to encourage and infuse
state actions with traditional Hawaiian concepts and values.
5 Comm. of the Whole Debates on Hawaiian Affairs Prop. No. 12 reprinted in 2 Proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978 (1980) at 426.
6 Standing Comm. Rep. No. 57 on HawaiianAffairs Prop. No. 12 reprinted in I Proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978 (1980) at 640.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In Hawai'i, the transition from a land tenure system characterised by use-rights
of the high chief, other chiefs, and maka'ainana7 or common people to one
of private land ownership occurred in a process called the Mahele. Mahele
means division or share, and designates a series of steps undertaken by the
Hawaiian Kingdom in the mid-19th century, separating out the interests of
the government, king, chiefs and people in all the lands of Hawaii.' Complex
reasons have been given for this voluntary transformation of the land tenure
system by Kamehameha III and the chiefs - among them, increasing the
status of the new kingdom-state among the independent sovereign states;
the fear that Hawaii would be forcibly annexed by one of the Western
powers, in which case private property rights would be recognised; pressure
from Western business interests desiring to own land so that profits could
be made in sugar and ranching; and the belief, expressed primarily by the
Protestant missionaries, that owning land would make Native Hawaiians more
industrious, give them a secure living, and bring them into the "civilised" world
and thereby stem the drastic decline in the Hawaiian population.'
One formulation for the Mahele, as set out in the principles adopted by the
Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles, which had been established to
settle all private claims to land existing prior to 10 December 1845, envisioned
one-third of the lands going to the King, one-third to the chiefs, and the
final third to native tenants.10 Indeed, this was in keeping with Hawai'i's
first constitution, the Constitution of 1840, which declared that the land and
its resources were not the private property of the King but "belonged to the
Chiefs and the people in common, of whom [the King] was the head and had
the management of the landed property."
7 Maka'ainana means commoner, populace, people in general, and literally "people that attend
the land". Mary Kalvena Pukui and Samuel H. Elbert Hawaiian Dictionary (University of
Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 1986) ["Hawaiian Dictionary"J.
8 For a discussion of the division of lands between Karmehameha III and the chiefs and
konohiki, see Lilikala Kame'eleihilva Native Lands and Foreign Desires (Bishop Museum
Press, Hawai'i) at 227-285. Earlier scholars set the number of ali'i receiving lands as 245;
see, for instance, Marion Kelly "Land Tenure in Havai'i" (1980, Fall-Winter) 7(2)Amerasia
Journal 65 (Asian American Studies Center, University of California at Los Angeles).
9 For various perspectives on the factors leading to the Mahele, see generally, Kame'eleihiwa,
above note 8, at 169-225; Robert 1H Stauffer Kahana: How the Land Vas Lost (University
of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2003) at 9-76; Stuart Banner Possessing the Pacific (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts) at 128-162; Jon Van Dyke Who Owns the
Crown Lands of Hawai'i? (University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2007) at 19-58.
10 "Principles Adopted by the Board of Connissioners to Quiet Land Titles (Aug. 20, 1846)",
reprinted in Revised Laws of Hawaii of 1925 (vol 2) at 2124 ["2 Revised Laws 1925"].
11 Haw. Const. of 1840, reprinted in LorrinA Thurston (ed) The Fundamental Law of Hawaii
3 (The Hawaiian Gazette Company Ltd, Honolulu, 1904).
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Beginning on 27 January 1848, all lands in Hawai'i were divided between
Kamehameha III and the chiefs and recorded in the Mahele Book. The King
quit-claimed his interest in specific traditional land units called ahupua'a and
'ili,12 and the chiefs quit-claimed their interests in the balance of the lands to
the King. These quit-claims did not confer title, but merely acknowledged
that the King had no claim to these specific lands of the chiefs and the chiefs
had no claim to the King's lands.I
After this initial division, the chiefs or konohikill were still required to go
before a land commission and make claim to their lands. In addition, they
had to pay a commutation tax of one-third the value of the unimproved land
or cede one-third of the land to the government. The konohiki were entitled
to receive full allodial title to their lands in the form of royal patents. These
awards specifically reserved the rights of the native tenants by including the
phrase "Koe nae no kuleana o na kanaka maloko"16 or similar wording. The
konohiki received awards to lands by name only, with the ancient boundaries
pertaining until a survey could be made. Subsequently, in 1862. a Boundary
Commission was established to settle questions of the boundaries of the
ahupua'a and 'li awarded by name only."
After the last division between Kamehameha III and the chiefs on 7 March
1848, the king held approximately 2.5 million acres or 60.3 per cent of the
total land, while the chiefs had received a total approximating 1.6 million
12 An ahupua'a is a land division, usually extending from the uplands to the sea (Hawaiian
Dictionary). An 'ili is a smaller land division, usually within an ahupua'a and next in
importance to the ahupua'a (ibid). An early Hawai'i case explained that traditionally the
ahupua'a afforded to the chief and people "a fishery residence at the warm seaside, together
with the products of the high lands, such as fuel, canoe timber, mountain birds, and the
right-of-way to the same, and all the varied products of the intermediate land as might be
suitable to the soil and climate of the different altitudes from sea soil to mountainside or
top." In re Boundaries of Pulehunui, 4 Haw. 239, 241 (1879).
13 Louis Cannelora The Origin of Hawaii Land Titles and of the Rights of Native Tenants
(Security Title Corporation, Honolulu, 1974) at 15; see Kanoa v Meek, 6 Hawv. 63 (1871).
14 Konohiki is defined as a "headman of an ahupua'a land division under the chief" (Hawaiian
Dictionary). Subsequent to the Maliele, the term was used to indicate the grantee of an
ahupua'a or 'ili and the grantee's successor. Robinson v Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641 670. n.26.
658 P2d 287, 307 (1982).
15 The konohiki were given several extensions of time in which to file and prove their claims.
See Act of August 10, 1854, reprinted in 2 Revised Laws 1925, above note 10, at 2147;
Act of August 24, 1860, reprinted in 2 Revised Laws 1925, at 2148; and Act of December
16, 1892, reprinted in 2 Revised Laws 1925, at 2151. The last act allowed claims until I
Januaryv 1895, after which all lands not claimed reverted to the government.
16 In Kalipi v Hawaiian Trust Co. Ltd, 66 Hawv. 1, 656 P2d 745 (1982); this phrase was
translated as: "The kuleanas [sic] of the people therein are excepted."
17 Act of August 23, 1862, reprinted in 2 Revised Laws 1925.
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acres.18 The king then divided his lands into two parts. The larger portion,
approximately 1.5 million acres, he "set apart forever to the chiefs and people"
of the kingdom.0 Later in the year, the legislative council ratified and accepted
the lands conveyed to the chiefs and people, declaring them to be "set apart
as the lands of the Hawaiian government, subject always to the rights of
tenants" .20 These lands were designated as Government Lands.
Kamehameha III retained for himself, his heirs and successors the remaining
lands, nearly 1 million acres.1 These private lands became known as the
King's Lands. When this action was ratified by the legislature. the King's
Lands were also made subject to the rights of native tenants.2
Consequently, as a result of the Mahele, all lands of the king, government
and chiefs were given subject to the rights of native tenants. It wasn't until
1850, however, that a process was established to more firmly delineate the
rights of native tenants.
A. The Kuleana Act
The final step in the Mahele process was dividing out the interests of the
maka'ainana or common people. The Kuleana Act of 6 August 1850 authorised
the land commission to award fee simple title to native tenants for their plots
of land.> Hoa'aina or tenant farmers could apply for their own plots of land or
kuleana.24 A kuleana parcel could come from lands of the king, government,
or chiefs. Moreover. native tenants were not required to pay a commutation
tax since the chief or konohiki of the ahupua'a or 'ili kopono in which the
kuleana was located was responsible for the commutation. Consequently,
upon the death of a kuleana owner without an heir, the kuleana escheated to
the owner of the ahupua'a or 'ili kupono who had a reversionary interest as
a result of paying the commutation.2'
I8 Jon J Chinen The Great Mahele: Hawaii's Land Division of 1848 (University of Hawai'i
Press, Honolulu, 1958) at 25, 31.
19 Van Dyke, above note 9, at 42, gives the following totals: the King's lands constituted
984,000 acres, the Government Lands were 1,523,000 acres, and the lands granted to the
Chiefs totalled 1,619000 acres.
20 ActofJune 7, 1848, reprinted in2 Revised Laws 1925, abovenote 10, at2 152-2176(listing
of lands and act ratifying division of lands).
21 See Estate of Kameharneha IV, 2 Haw. 715, 722-723 (1864).
22 Act of June 7, 1848, above note 20.
23 Act of August 6, 1850, reprinted in 2 Revised Laws 1925, above note 10, at 2141-2142
["Kuleana Act"] - In this context, kuleana means a small piece of property (Hawaiian
Dictionary).
24 Ibid.
25 Chinen, above note 18, at 30 (1958).
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While kuleana lands were generally among the richest and most fertile in the
islands, there were a number of restrictions placed on kuleana claims. First,
kuleana could only include the land that a tenant had actually cultivated plus
a houselot of not more than a quarter acre. 26 Second, the native tenant was
required to pay for a survey of the land as well as bring two witnesses to
testify to the tenant's right to the land. 27
One scholar estimates that the Land Commission approved 8,421 awards,
averaging less than 3 acres per award, to 29 per cent of the adult Native
Hawaiian male population.2 The original plan adopted by the king and chiefs
for division of the land had stated that the maka'ainana were to receive. after
the king partitioned out his personal lands, one-third of the land of Hawai'i.
However, only 28,658 acres, much less than one per cent of the total land,
went to the maka'ainana through this claims process.2
Recognising that not all natives would be able to claim kuleana, another
provision of the KuleanaAct allowed natives to purchase between one and 50
acres of government lands at a minimum of 50 cents an acre. 0 One researcher
estimates that the maka'ainana received another 150,000 acres through this
provision of the Kuleana Act.3' Moreover, it is generally conceded that
although the makaainana received fewer acres, these lands were the most
fertile and productive. 2
The only section of the Kuleana Act that has survived is section 7, codified
today as Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("Haw. Rev. Stat.") § 7-1 :13
Building materials, water, etc.; landlords' titles subject to tenants' use.
Where the landlords have obtained, or may hereafter obtain, allodial titles to
their lands, the people on each of their lands shall not be deprived of the right
to take firewood, house-timber, aho cord, thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on
which they live, for their own private use, but they shall not have a right to take
such articles to sell for profit. The people shall also have a right to drinking
water, and running water, and the right of way. The springs of water, running
26 Kuleana Act, above note 23, sections 5-6.
27 Land Commission Principles, reprinted in 2 Revised Laws 1925, above note 10, at 2134.
28 Karne'eleihiwa, above note 8, at 295-297, citing Marion Kelly "Results of the GreatMahele
of 1848 and the Kuleana Act of 1850" (unpublished manuscript).
29 Jon J Chinen They Cried for Help (Xlibris Corporation, 2002) at 141-142, citing the 1896
Thrum's (Hawaiian) Annual.
30 Kuleana Act, above note 23, section 4.
31 Donovan Preza, MA Candidate in Political Science lecture to Native Hawaiian Rights Class
(University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 15 September 2008).
32 Stauffer, above note 9, at 5.
33 Haw. Rev. Stat. 7-1 (2008).
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water, and roads shall be free to all, on all lands granted in fee simple; provided
that this shall not be applicable to wells and watercourses, which individuals
have made for their own use.
The KuleanaAct's legislative history indicates that this section was included at
the request of Kamehameha III. The Privy Council minutes show Kamehameha
III's concern that "a little bit of land even with allodial title, if they Ithe people]
were cut off from all other privileges, would be of very little value".34 The
Privy Council thus adopted the King's suggestion:'
[TLhe proposition of the King, which he inserted as the seventh clause of the
law, a rule for the claims of the common people to go to the mountains, and
the seas attached to their own particular land exclusively, is agreed to[.]
The original version of this section required the tenant to seek the consent of
the konohiki in exercising these rights. The consent provisions were eliminated
in 1851, the legislature reciting that "many difficulties and complaints have
arisen, from the bad feeling existing on account of the Konohiki's [sic]
forbidding the tenants on the lands enjoying the benefits that have been by
law given them"."3
The Kuleana Act provided native tenants the right of access to their kuleana
and also gave them unobstructed access within the ahupua'a to obtain items
necessary for their subsistence and to make their lands productive. However,
the first Hawai'i case to discuss the provision interpreted it narrowly to
disallow any customary rights not specifically identified in section 7.
B. Oni v Meek, 2 Haw. 87 (1858)
The first Hawai'i Supreme Court case to discuss the scope of the rights under
section 7 of the Kuleana Act was Oni v Meek (1858). Oni, a tenant of the
ahupua'a of Honouliuli, O'ahu, filed suit against John Meek, who had leased
the entire ahupua'a from its konohiki. Oni brought suit when some of his
horses, which had been pastured on Meek's land, were impounded and sold
34 3B Privy Council Record 681, 713 (1850).
35 3B Privy Council Record 681, 763 (1850).
36 Act Of July 11 1851, Statute Laws of His Maiesty Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian
Islands 98-99 (1851).
37 Oni v Meek, 2 Haw. 87 (1858).
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by Meek. Oni claimed that he had a right to pasture his horses, presenting two
legal bases for that right: (1) custom; and (2) the Act of 1846, predecessor to
the Kuleana Act, which allowed a tenant the right of pasturage.31
The Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected both arguments. First, the Court appeared
to reject the idea that any form of custom had survived the change to a fee
simple land tenure system and enactment of the Kuleana Act, stating that,
"the custom contended for is so unreasonable, so uncertain and so repugnant
to the spirit of the present laws, that it ought not to be sustained by judicial
authoritv". The Court continued:40
it is perfectly clear that, if the plaintiff is a hoaaina [native tenant],41 holding
his land by virtue of a fee simple award from the Land Commission, he has
no pretense for claiming a right of pasturage by custom, for so far as that right
ever was customary, it was annexed to the holding of land by a far different
tenure from that by which he now holds.
The Court also concluded that while the Act of 1846 was not expressly repealed
by subsequent legislation, it was implicitly repealed by the passage of the
1850 KuleanaAct.42 The Court noted several unsuccessful attempts after 1850
to include a right of pasturage in the Kuleana Act.43 Moreover, the Kuleana
Act had been amended after 1850, but the right of pasturage had not been
38 Ibid, at91-92; see also Joint Resolutions on the Subject of Rights in Lands and the Leasing,
Purchasing, and Dividingofthe Same, § I (Nov. 7, 1846),2Haw.L. 1847, at 70, reprinted in
2 Revised Laws 1925, above note 10, at 2193. The Joint Resolutions provided, in pertinent
part, that:
The rights of the Hoaaina in the land, consists of his own taro patches, and all other
places which he himself cultivates for his own use; and if he wish to extend his
cultivation on unoccupied parts, he has the right to do so. He has also rights in the
grass land [sic], if there be any under his care, and he may take grass for his own use
or for sale, and may also take fuel and timber from the mountains for himself. He
may also pasture his horse and cow and other animals on the land, but not in such
numbers as to prevent the konohiki from pasturing his. He cannot make agreements
with others for the pasturage of their animals without the consent of his konohiki, and
the Minister of the Interior
Joint Resolutions, supra, cited in Oni, 2 Haw. at 91-92.
39 Ibid, at 90.
40 Ibid.
41 Hoa'aina means tenant (Hawaiian Dictionary).
42 Oni, 2 Haw. at 94 (finding that "several of the provisions of the [Kuleana Act (Aug. 6,
1850)] are clearly inconsistent with those of the [Joint Resolutions (Nov. 7, 1846)], and ...
so far as this is true, the provisions of 1846 must be held, by necessary implication, to be
repealed by those of 1850").
43 Ibid, at 95 (noting that "during several subsequent sessions of the Legislature, petitions were
presented for the enactment of a law granting to the common people the right of pasturage
on the lands of the konohikis, but without success").
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included.44 Pointing to these unsuccessful attempts to amend the enumerated
rights of tenants in the Kuleana Act, the Court stated, "it was the intention
of the Legislature to declare, in this enactment, all the specific rights of the
hoaaina (excepting fishing rights) which should be held to prevail against the
fee simple title of the konohiki" .45 Thus, Oni construed the Kuleana Act as
the exclusive source of rights reserved to ahupuaa tenants.
For over a hundred years, the Oni case appeared to foreclose claims based
on custom, standing for the proposition that all customary rights of native
tenants had been abrogated except for those rights explicitly listed in Haw.
Rev. Stat. section 7- 1. In 1995, however, the Hawai'i Supreme Court, in a case
discussed in detail below, explained that "Oni merely rejected one particular
claim based upon an apparently non-traditional practice that had not achieved
customary status in the area where the right was asserted."46
C. 4W4I'I REVISED SATUTES SECION 1-1
The Hawaiian usage exception., set forth in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 1-1, is a second
basis for customary and traditional rights:4
Common law of the State; exceptions. The common law of England, as
ascertained by English and American decisions, is declared to be the common
law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State.
or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage;
provided that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as
provided by the written laws of the United States or of the State.
Since section 1-1 is derived from section 5 of Act 57, approved on 25
November 1892, Hawai'i Courts have held that "Hawaiian usage is usage
that predates 25 November 1892.48
In Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v Hawai'i County Planning
Commission (1995) ("P4SH").49 discussed below, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court concluded that section 1-1 "represents the codification of custom as
it applies in our State".' In reviewing section 1-1, the Court noted that the
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 R4SH, 79 Hawai'i at 441, 903 P.2d, at 1262.
47 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 1-1 (2004) (emphasis added).
48 State v Zimring, 52 Haw. 472, 474-74, 479 P2d 202, 204 (1970).
49 R4SH, 79 Hawai'i 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995), aff'g 79 Hawai'i 246, 900 P2d 1313 (App.
1993), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1163 (1996).
50 Ibid, at 447, 903 P2d at 1268.
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principles codified in the statute have a much earlier origin.' Custom and
usage governed the Kingdom almost exclusively until the promulgation of
the Declaration of Rights in 1839.52 As the government developed further,
oral traditions and laws were codified in written form. The third Act of
Kamehameha III created an independent Judiciary. The Judiciary was given
the authority to cite and adopt:3
the reasonings and analysis of the common law, and of the civil law [of other
countries] ... so far as they are deemed to be founded in justice, and not in
conflict with the laws and usages of this kingdom.
When the Kingdom adopted a Civil Code in 1859. section 14 included
"received usage" as a source of law.54 On 25 November 1892, the Judiciary
was reorganised., repealing the relevant section in the 1859 Civil Code and
adopting language similar to that found in section 1-1.55 The original language.
however, referred to the common law and Constitution ofthe Hawaiian Islands,
"or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian national
usage". The Organic Act of 1900, which organised the territorial government
under US control, made this provision applicable to the Territory of Hawai'i.56
When the laws of the Territory were reorganised and compiled in 1905, that
statute became chapter 1. section 1 of the Revised Laws of Hawai'i.5
III. 1978 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND SUBSEQUENT CASES
As noted above, in 1978. the Hawai'i Constitution was amended to include a
provision protecting the traditional and customary rights of ahupua'a tenants.
A review of the Committee Reports and Constitutional Convention debates
on the amendment indicates that the provision was meant to be liberally
construed and to cover the widest possible range of customary rights: 8 The
debates particularly highlight the various perspectives on whether the rights
to be protected by the amendment were those already established in Haw.
Rev. Stats. Section 1-1 and 7-1 or whether the section granted "new" rights.
51 Ibid, at 437, 903 P2d at 1258, n.21.
52 See 1 Statute Laws of His Majesty Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands 3
(1845-1846).
53 Act of September 7, 1847, ch. I, I I 2 Statute Laws of His MaJesty Kamehameha III,
King of the Hawaiian Islands 5 (1847).
54 See Civil Code ch. 3 § 14 (1859).
55 See Session Laws ch. LVI , 5 (1892).
56 See An Act to Provide a Government for the Territory of Hawaii (Organic Act) §§ 6, 10,
32, Act of Apr. 30, 1900, c. 339, 31 Stat. 141.
57 See Revised Laws of Haw. ch. 1, § 1 (1905).
58 Standing Comm. Rep. No. 57 on Hawaiian Affairs Prop. No. 12, reprinted in I Proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978 (1980) at 640.
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Chair of the Hawaiian Affairs Committee, Delegate Frenchy De Soto, as well
as Delegate Hoe, a member of the committee, stated several times that no
new rights were being established. 9 Delegate Waihee made the point that the
provision was a vehicle for an individual to prove the existence of traditional
rights and that if the burden of proof was met, the right would then become
subject to state regulation.60 Delegate Burgess, who opposed the amendment,
clearly believed that the section went beyond reaffirming existing rights and
granted new rights.61 There was overwhelming support for the amendment,
which easily passed out of the convention. Although the amendment was
enacted in 1978, it was not until 1982 that the Hawai'i Supreme Court decided
the first case relating to the provision.
A. Kalipi v Hawaiian Trust Co.
In Kalipi v Hawaiian Trust Co. (1982),62 its first case on Native Hawaiian
gathering rights, the Hawai'i Supreme Court stated: '
We recognize that permitting access to private property for the purpose of
gathering natural products may indeed conflict with the exclusivity traditionally
associated with fee simple ownership of land. But any argument for the
extinguishing of traditional rights based simply upon the possible inconsistency
of purported native rights with our modern system of land tenure must fail.
For the Court's obligation to preserve and enforce such traditional rights is a
part of our Hawaii State Constitution.
The Court continued, citing the full text ofArticle XII, section 7, and stating,
"it is this expression of policy which must guide our determinations".6 4
In this case, William Kalipi, who owned a taro field in Manawai and an
adjoining houselot in 'Ohi'a, Moloka'i, filed suit against owners of the
ahupua'a of Manawai and 'Ohi'a when he was denied unrestricted gathering
rights in those ahupua'a. Kalipi had been raised on the houselot and lived
there and worked the taro field until 1975, but had since moved to Keawenui,
a neighbouring ahupua'a. Kalipi sought to gather certain items for subsistence
59 Second Reading, Comm. of the Whole Rep. No. 12 on Hawn. Aff Prop. No. 12, reprinted
in I Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978 (1980) at 277.
60 Ibid, at 2 78.
61 Second Reading, Comm. of the Whole Rep. No. 12 on Hawn. Aff Prop. No. 12, reprinted
in I Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978 (1980) at 275.
62 66 Haw. 1, 656 P2d 745 (1982).
63 66 Haw. 1, 4, 656 P2d 745, 748.
64 Ibid.
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and medicinal purposes, citing three sources for his claim - Haw. Rev. Stat.
sections 7-1 and 1-1 and language in the original title documents ofthe relevant
ahupua'a that reserved the people's rights.61
With regard to Kalipi's claims based on Haw. Rev. Stat. section 7-1,66 which
enumerates items that can be gathered within an ahupua'a by a native tenant
- firewood, house-timber, aho cord, thatch, or kT-leaf,67 the Court held that
a native tenant asserting a right to gather under section 7-1 must meet three
conditions: (1) the native tenant must reside within the relevant ahupua'a;
(2) the right to gather must be exercised upon undeveloped lands: and (3) the
right must be exercised in order to practise Hawaiian customs and traditions.6
Although section 7-1 did not contain an "undeveloped lands" requirement, the
Court reasoned that it must be deemed a condition precedent, since gathering
on developed lands would conflict with modern property law as well the
"cooperation and non-interference with the well-being of other residents" that
were integral parts of the traditional "Hawaiian way of life".'69 In the Court's
view, only if all conditions were satisfied would a tenant have a right to
gather; moreover, gathering would be restricted solely to those items expressly
enumerated in the statute.70 In an important footnote, the Court stated that the
rights under section 7-1 are rights of access and collection:7,
They do not include any inherent interest in the natural objects themselves
until they are reduced to the gatherer's possession. As such those asserting the
rights cannot prevent the diminution or destruction of those things they seek.
The rights therefore do not prevent owners from developing lands.
Unfortunately, Kalipi did not physically reside within either the ahupuaa of
Manawai or 'Ohi'a, and thus, under the Court's formulation, could not assert
rights under Haw. Rev. Stat. section 7-1.72
65 Ibid, at 3-4, 656 p2d at 747.
66 Ibid, at 4-5, 656 p2d at 747-748.
67 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 7-1 (2004).
68 Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 7-8, 656 P2d at 749 (stating that "[w]e believe that this balance [between
customary practices and private property rights] is struck, consistent with our constitutional
mandate and the language and intent of the statute, by interpreting the gathering rights
of [H.R.S.] § 7-1 to assure that lawful occupants of an abupuaa may, for the purposes of
practicing native Hawaiian customs and traditions, enter undeveloped lands within the
ahupuaa to gather those items enumerated in the statute").
69 Ibid, at 9, 656 P2d at 750.
70 Ibid, at 7-9, 656 p2d at 749-50.
71 Ibid, at 8, 656 P2d at 749, n.2.
72 Ibid, at 9, 656 P2d at 750.
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In reviewing Kalipi's claims under Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1, the Court
articulated a balancing test in which the retention of a Hawaiian tradition is
determined first by deciding if a custom has continued in a particular area and,
second, by balancing the respective interests of the practitioner and harm to
the landowner. The Court observed:71
We perceive the Hawaiian usage exception to the adoption of the English
common law to represent an attempt on the part of the framers of the statute
to avoid results inappropriate to the isles' inhabitants by permitting the
continuance of native understandings and practices which did not unreasonably
interfere with the spirit of the common law. The statutory exception to the
common law is thus akin to the English doctrine of custom whereby practices
and privileges unique to particular districts continued to apply to the residents of
those districts even though in contravention of the common law. This, however.,
is not to say that we find that all the requisite elements of the doctrine of custom
were necessarily incorporated in § 1-1. Rather, we believe that the retention
of a Hawaiian tradition should in each case be determined by balancing the
respective interests and harm once it is established that the application of the
custom has continued in a particular area.
The Court also clarified that Oni v Meek rejected a particular custom
pasturage - as opposed to custom in general. The Court thus interpreted
section 1-1 as "a vehicle for the continued existence of those customary
rights which continued to be practiced and which worked no actual harm
upon the recognized interests of others".74 Applying the balancing test, the
Kalipi Court held that where practices associated with the Hawaiian way
of life "have, without harm to anyone, been continued, ... the reference to
Hawaiian usage in § 1-1 insures their continuance for so long as no actual
harm is done thereby",.7
Because there was no evidence in the record to find that gathering rights
customarily extended to persons who did not reside within the ahupua'a in
which the rights are asserted, and because Kalipi was not a resident of the
ahupua'a, the Court held that he did not have gathering rights under Haw.
Rev. Stat. section 1-1.76
73 lbid, at 10, 656 P2d at 750-51 (citations omitted).
74 Ibid, at 1, 656 P.2d at 752.
75 lbid, at 10, 656 P2d at 751. The Court clearly stated that "[t]hese [practices] include the
gathering of items not delineated in [H.R.S.] § 7-1 and the use of defendants' lands for
spiritual and other purposes". Ibid, at 10, 656 P2d at 751 n.4.
76 lbid, at 12 -13, 656 P2d at 752.
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Finally, with regard to Kalipi's claim under the native tenants right reservation
found in the original awards of the two ahupua'a, the Court intimated that
an earlier case, that appeared to limit such rights was not dispositive.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that as with the rights preserved by sections
7-1 or 1-1, traditional gathering rights do not accrue to persons who are not
residents of the ahupua'a in which the rights are sought to be asserted.7,
B. Pele Defense Fund v Paty
Ten years later, in Pele Defense Fundv Paty (1992),.9 the Hawai'i Supreme
Court recognised that:80
native Hawaiian rights protected by article XII, section 7 [of the Hawai'i
Constitution] may extend beyond the ahupua'a in which a native Hawaiian
resides where such rights have been customarily and traditionally exercised
in this manner.
In this case, Native Hawaiian residents of ahupua'a neighbouring a large
tract of land, Wao Kele 0 Puna, on the Island of Hawai'i, based their claims
on Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1 and Article XII, section 7. In the trial Court,
they had submitted evidence to support their claims concerning the exercise
of subsistence, cultural and religious practices according to ancient custom
and tradition in the Wao Kele 0 Puna area.'
The Hawai'i Supreme Court explained that although the Kalipi case had
limited gathering rights under section 7-1 to the ahupua'a in which a native
tenants lives, the Court in Kalipi also held that section 1-i's "Hawaiian usage"
clause may establish certain customary Hawaiian rights beyond those found
in section 7-1.82 The Pele Court also reviewed the proceedings of the 1978
Constitutional Convention, noting that the Hawaiian Affairs Committee
"contemplated that some traditional rights might extend beyond the ahupua'a"
and found persuasive the Hawaiian Affairs Committee's statement that the
amendment should not be narrowly construed.81 The Court concluded:84
77 In Territory v Liliuokalani, 14 Haw. 88, 95 (1902), the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that
"the words 'koe nae ke kuleana o na kanaka [reserving however the people's kuleana rights
therein]' ... refer to the house lots and taro patches and gardens of tenants living on land
within the boundaries of the larger tract granted" and did not incorporate any public right
to the use of certain shoreline areas included within a grant of land.
78 Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 12; 656 P.2d at 752.
79 73 Hawai'i 578, 837 P2d 1247 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 (1993).
80 Ibid, at 620, 837 P.2d at 1272.
81 Ibid, at 618, 620-21, 837 P2d, at 12 71, 1272.
82 lbid, at 619, 837 P2d at 1271.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid, at 621, 837 P2d at 1272.
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if it can be shown that Wao Kele '0 Puna was a traditional gathering area
utilized by the tenants of the abutting ahupua'a, and that the other requirements
of Kalipi are met in this case, then PDF members ... may have a right to enter
the undeveloped areas of [W~ao Kele 0 Puna] to exercise their traditional
practices.
In a footnote, the Court also reiterated its earlier holding that Article XII,
section 7. does not require the preservation of lands in their natural state.-
On remand in Pele Defense Fund v Estate ofJames Campbell (2002),86 the
trial Court ruled in favour of Pele Defense Fund, determining that customarily
and traditionally exercised subsistence and cultural activities actually practised
by Native Hawaiians in the Puna area prior to 1892 were not limited to one's
ahupua'a of residence or by common law concepts associated with tenancy
or land ownership.
C. Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v Hawai'i County Planning
Commission
In Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v Hawai'i County Planning Commission
(1995) ("P4SH"),87 Defendant Nansay Hawai'i ("Nansay") had applied for a
Special Management Area (SMA) permit to develop a resort complex on the
island of Hawai'i, and the shoreline organisation, Public Access Shoreline
Hawai'i ("PASH"), which opposed the development, filed a request for a
contested case hearing before the Hawai'i Planning Commission. The Planning
Commission denied PASH's request for a hearing and issued the SMA permit
and PASH filed suit. The trial Court vacated the SMA permit and directed the
Planning Commission to hold a contested case hearing in which PASH would
be allowed to participate. On appeal, the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that:
(1) the circuit Court had jurisdiction to consider the claims: (2) PASH had
standing, so a contested case hearing should be held: and, most importantly, (3)
Native Hawaiians retain rights to pursue traditional and customary activities,
since land patents in Hawai'i confirm only a limited property interest when
compared with Western land patents/concepts of property.
85 lbid, at 62 1, 837 P2d at 1272, n.36.
86 Pele Defense Fund v Paty, No. 89-089 Haw. 3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2002 (Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order) (on file with author).
87 R4SH, 79 Hawai'i at 429, 903 P.2d at 1250.
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Nansay Hawaii did not contest PASH's claims on the exercise of traditional
native Hawaiian gathering rights, including gathering for food and fishing
for 'Opae, or shrimp,85 but argued that "[w]hen the owner develops land,
the gathering rights disappear".89 The Court rejected this argument, holding
that the State is obligated to protect the reasonable exercise of traditional
and customary rights to the extent feasible. 0 The Court's opinion traced the
origins of Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1 back to the third Act of Kamehameha
11101 authorising the adoption of common law principles, provided they were
"not in conflict with the laws and usages of this kingdom".92 The PASH Court
further stressed that "the precise nature and scope of the rights retained by
[Haw. Rev. Stat.] § 1-1 ... depend upon the particular circumstances of each
case".91
The Court devoted considerable attention to the extent that Haw. Rev. Stat.
section 1-1 preserved customary practices, noting that Kahpi specifically
refused to decide the "ultimate scope" of traditional rights under section 1-1.
The Court also distinguished the doctrine of custom in Hawai'i in several
ways. First, contrary to the "time immemorial" standard used by English and
American common law, traditional and customary practices in Hawai'i must
be established in practice by 25 November 1892.9 Second, continuous exercise
of the right is not required, although the custom may become more difficult
to prove.95 The PASH Court stated, "[t he right of each ahupua'a tenant to
exercise traditional and customary practices remains intact, notwithstanding
arguable abandonment of a particular site"."6
The Court set out a test for the doctrine of custom, requiring that a custom be
consistent when measured against other custons;' a practice be certain in an
objective sense, "IA] particular custom is certain if it is objectively defined
and applied; certainty is not subjectively determined";95 and a traditional
88 Ibid, at 430, 903 P2d at 1251 n.6 (noting that Nansay "did not directly dispute the assertion
that unnamed members of PASH possess traditional native Hawaiian gathering rights at
Kohanaiki, including food gathering and fishing for 'opae, or shrimp, which are harvested
from the anchialline ponds located on Nansay's proposed dev elopment site").
89 Second Supplemental Brief (Opening Brief) for Petitioner-Appellee-Appellant Nansay
Hawaii at 19, PASH, 79 Hawai'i 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995).
90 PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 451 903 P2d at 1272.
91 Ibid, at 437, 903 P.2d at 1258 n.21.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid, at 438, 440, 903 P2d at 1259, 1261.
94 Ibid, at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268.
95 Ibid, at 441, 903 P2d at1262 n.26 (citation omitted).
96 Ibid, at 450 903 P2d at 1271.
97 Ibid, at 447, 903 P2d at 1268 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98 Ibid (internal quotation marks omitted).
2010 & 2011 I127
Yearbook ofNew Zealand Jurisprudence Vols 13 & 14
use be exercised in a reasonable manner.9 Defining the reasonable use
requirement, the Court further explained that the balance leans in favour of
establishing a use in the sense that "even if an acceptable rationale cannot
be assigned, the custom is still recognized as long as there is no 'good legal
reason' against it". oo
The Court also held that the State has the authority to reconcile competing
interests;101 thus, "[d]epending on the circumstances of each case, once land
has reached the point of 'full development' it may be inconsistent to allow
or enforce the practice of traditional Hawaiian gathering rights on such
property".o2 The PASH Court, however, clearly stated that:o10
[a]lthough access is only guaranteed in connection with undeveloped lands,
and article XI, section 7 [of the Hawai'i Constitution] does not require the
preservation of such lands, the State does not have the unfettered discretion
to regulate the[se] rights ... out of existence.
The PASH Court also clarified that:104
those persons who are "descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the
islands prior to 1778," and who assert otherwise valid customary and traditional
Hawaiian rights tinder HRS 1 -1, are entitled to protection regardless of their
blood quantum.
The PASH Court, however, declined to decide whether descendants of non-
Hawaiian citizens of the Hawaiian Kingdom are entitled to such protection and
expressly reserved comment on the question whether non-Hawaiian members
of an 'ohana may "legitimately claim rights protected by article XII, section
7 of the state constitution and H.R.S. § 1-l. 1
While recognising that "the western concept of exclusivity is not universally
applicable in Hawai'i", the Court addressed concerns that the ruling could
theoretically lead to disruption by relying on non-confrontational aspects of
traditional Hawaiian culture, which should "minimize potential disturbances".
The Court also pointed out that "the State retains the ability to reconcile
competing interests under article XIl, section 7".106 The State's regulatory
99 Ibid, at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
100 Ibid (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid, at 451, 903 P.2d at 1272 (emphasis added).
103 Ibid (emphasis added); see also ibid at 441, 903 P.2d at 1262 n.26 (stating that one of the
requirements for custom is that the use or right at issue is "obligatory or compulsory (when
established)").
104 Ibid, at 449, 903 P2d at 1270.
105 Ibid, at 449, 903 P.2d at 1270 ni.41 'Ohana is afamily or kin group (Hawaiian Dictionary).
106 Ibid, at 447, 903 P2d at 1268.
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authority does not provide it with "the unfettered discretion to regulate the
rights of ahupuaa tenants out of existence". '0' However, the State is authorised
to permit private property owners to exclude persons "pursuing non-traditional
practices or exercising otherwise valid customary rights in an unreasonable
manner'.08
The Hawai'i Supreme Court's guidance in PASH was never applied in that
case; the landowner withdrew its permit application and the proceedings
were terminated.109
D. State v Hanapi
In a criminal case, State v Hanapi (1998),11o the Hawaii Supreme Court
held that "it is the obligation of the person claiming the exercise of a native
Hawaiian right to demonstrate that the right is protected". The defendant,
Alapa'i Hanapi, lived in the ahupua'a of 'Aha'ino on the island of Moloka'i, on
property adjoining the two fishponds, Kihaloko and Waihilahila. 112 The owner
of land next to Hanapl's property had graded and filled the area near the ponds
in apparent violation of US Army Corps of Engineers wetland regulations.
The landowner thus conducted a voluntary, unsupervised restoration of the
area, with the advice and oversight of a consultant archaeologist.
HanapT saw the landowner's actions as a "desecration of [a] traditional
ancestral cultural site",1" and felt that it was his obligation as a Native
Hawaiian tenant to perform religious and traditional ceremonies to heal the
land. 114 Thus, HanapT twice entered the property to observe and monitor the
restoration."1 On a third visit, HanapT was ordered off the property; HanapT
refused and was arrested and charged with second-degree criminal trespass.
107 Ibid, at 451, 903 P2d at 1272; see also ibid at 442, 903 P2d at 1263 ("[1he regulatory
power provided in article XII section 7 does not justify summary extinguishment of such
[traditional and customary] rights by the State merely because they are deemed inconsistent
with generally understood elements of the western doctrine of 'property'.").
108 Ibid at 442, 903 P2d at 1263 (emphasis added).
109 Hugh Clark "Builder Withdraws its Kona Resort Application" Honolulu Advertiser (Hawai'i,
2 August 1996) at A5.
110 89 Hawai'i 177, 970 P.2d 485 (1998), recons. denied, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 34 (Haw. Feb. 8.
1999).
111 Ibid, at 184, 970 P2d at 492.
112 Ibid, at 178, 970 P2d at 486.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid, at IS1, 970 P2d at 489.
115 Ibid, at 178, 970 P2d at 486.
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At trial, Hanapi represented himself. The trial Court repeatedly sustained the
prosecution's objections as Hanapl asserted a defence of privilege based upon
his constitutional rights as aNative Hawaiian."' 6 Hanapi persisted and was able
to elicit some testimony in support of his defence. I Ultimately, Hanapl was
convicted of the criminal trespass charge. 8 On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme
Court concluded that the district Court's errors were harmless; Hanapy's
conviction was affirmed. " The Court stated, however, that "constitutionally
protected native Hawaiian rights, reasonably exercised, qualify as a privilege
for purposes of enforcing criminal trespass statutes". 120 The Court then
set forth three minimum requirements that must be met for a defendant to
successfully assert a defence based on a constitutionally protected Native
Hawaiian traditional and customary right:121
First, a defendant must qualify as a "native Hawaiian", regardless of blood
quantum, as defined in PASH- a descendant ofthe inhabitants ofthe Hawaiian
islands prior to 1778.m
Second, a defendant must "establish that his or her claimed right is
constitutionally protected as a customary or traditional native Hawaiian
practice". 12 The Court also stated that in order to establish the existence of a
traditional or customary Native Hawaiian practice, there must be an "adequate
foundation in the record connecting the claimed right to a firmly rooted
traditional or customary native Hawaiian practice". 124 Such a foundation can
be made through the testimony of kamaaina witnesses or experts as proof of
Hawaiian custom and usage.125
116 Ibid, at 179-181, 970 P2d at 487-89.
117 Ibid, at 185, 970 P2d at 493.
118 Ibid, at 181, 970 P.2d at 489.
119 Ibid, at 185, 188, 970 P2d at 493, 496.
120 Ibid, at 184, 940 P2d at 492.
121 Ibid, at 185-86, 970 P.2d at 493-94.
122 Ibid, at 186, 970 P2d at 494.
123 Ibid, at 186, 970 P.2d at 494. The Court noted that, although some customary and traditional
native Hawaiian rights are codified in the H-awai'i Constitution, article XII, section 7, or in
H.R.S. sections 1-1 and7-1, " [t]he fact that the claimed right is not specifically enumerated
in the Constitution or statutes, does not preclude firther inquiry concerning other traditional
and customary practices that have existed". Ibid (citing PASJ, 79 Hawai'i at 438, 903 P.2d
at 1259).
124 Ibid, at 187, 970 P2d at 495.
125 Ibid. A kama'aina literally means "land child" and is one who is native-born and familiar
with a particular place (Hawaiian Dictionary).
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Finally, a defendant must show that "the exercise of the right occurred on
undeveloped or less than fully developed property". 126 In clarifying and
perhaps limiting PAST, the Court held that on property deemed "fully
developed", which it characterised as property zoned and used for residential
purposes with existing dwellings, improvements, and infrastructure, it is
always "inconsistent" to permit the practice of traditional and customary
rights. 127 The Court, however, also reserved the question of the status of
Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights on property that is "less
than fully developed".128
E. Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina v Land Use Comm'n.
In Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina v Land Use Commission (2000),"2 the Hawai'i
Supreme Court provided an analytical framework "to effectuate the State's
obligation to protect native Hawaiian customary and traditional practices
while reasonably accommodating competing private [property] interests".10
This case arose from the reclassification of nearly 1,010 acres of land in
the Ka'upulehu ahupua'a on the island of Hawai'i from conservation to
urban use by the State Land Use Commission ("LUC") upon application by
defendant Ka'upulehu Developments. Ka'upulehu Developments sought to
develop a luxury subdivision with upscale homes, a golf course and other
amenities. Plaintiffs argued that their Native Hawaiian members' customary
and traditional gathering rights would be adversely affected by the proposed
development.131
The Hawai'i Supreme Court held that the LUC improperly delegated its
obligations under Article XII, section 7, to the developer by placing a condition
in the order granting reclassification requiring the developer to "preserve and
protect any gathering and access rights of native Hawaiians". 132 The Court
stated that the wholesale delegation of responsibility for the preservation and
protection of such rights to the developer "was improper and misses the point.
These issues must be addressed before the land is reclassified". 1-3
The Court also held that: 134
126 Ibid, at 187, 970 P2d at 495 (citing R4SH, 79 Hawai'i at 450, 903 P.2d at 1271).
127 Ibid, at 186-87 and n.10, 970 P2d at 494-95, n.10.
128 Ibid, at 187, 970 P2d at 495 (citing R4SH, 79 Hawai'i at 450, 903 P.2d at 1271).
129 94 Hawai'i 31, 7 P3d 1068 (2000).
130 Ibid, at 46-47, 7 P3d at 1083-84.
131 Ibid, at 34-36, 7 P3d at 1071-73.
132 Ibid, at 50, 7 P3d at 1087.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid, at 35, 7 P3d at 1072.
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the [LUC's] findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient to determine
whether it fulfilled its obligation to preserve and protect customary and
traditional rights of native Hawaiians[;] [t]he LUC, therefore, must be deemed,
as a matter of law, to have failed to satisfy its statutory and constitutional
obligations.
The Court held that the LUC "must - at a minimum - make specific findings
and conclusions" regarding:13 5
(1) the identity and scope of "valued cultural, historical, or natural
resources" in the petition area, including the extent to which traditional
and customary native Hawaiian rights are exercised in the petition area;
(2) the extent to which those resources - including traditional and
customary native Hawaiian rights - will be affected or impaired by
the proposed action; and
(3) the feasible action, if any, to be taken by the [LUC] to reasonably
protect native Hawaiian rights if they are found to exist.
F. In re Waiola o Molokai
In a water case from the island of Moloka'i, In re Waiola o Aolokai (2004),116
the Hawai'i Supreme Court applied the analytical framework set out in Ka
Pa'akai. In reviewing a decision by the State Commission on Water Resource
Management (COWRM), the Court utilised Ka Pa'akai's guidelines to
find that COWRM had not met "its public trust obligation to protect native
Hawaiians' traditional and customary gathering rights",,7 by granting a water
use and well construction permit, without adequately protecting the natural
resources that are customarily and traditionally gathered. The Court stated: 18
A substantial population of native Hawaiians on Moloka'i engages in
subsistence living by fishing, diving, hunting, and gathering land and marine
flora and fauna to provide food for their families. Aside from the nutritional
and affordable diet, subsistence living is essential to (1) maintaining native
Hawaiians' religious and spiritual relationship to the land and nearshore
environment and (2) perpetuating their commitment to "malama ka aina,"
which mandates the protection of their natural ecosystems from desecration
and deprivation of their natural freshwater resources.
135 Ibid, at 47, 7 P3d at 1084.
136 103Hawai'i401 83P.3d664(2004).
137 Ibid, at 443, 83 P3d at 706.
138 Ibid, at 439, 83 P3d at 702.
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The Court found that, like the Land Use Commission in Ka Pa'akai, COWRM
"lacked an adequate evidentiary basis for its conclusion that [the developer's]
applied-for uses ... do not abridge or deny traditional or customary Hawaiian
rights, customs, practices, or appurtenant water rights, or any other rights
referred to in or protected by [Hawaii law]".'39 Thus, the Court vacated
the decision, holding that COWRM failed to place adequate conditions on
the permitted use in order to protect the natural resources that were the basis
of Native Hawaiian customary and traditional fishing and ocean gathering
practices.140
G. In re Kukui (Molokai) Inc.
In a more recent case, the Hawai'i Supreme Court again reviewed a COWRM
decision, this time approving a permit authorizing the use of over I million
gallons of water per day from Well- 17 on Moloka'i. The Court determined,
inter alia, that COWRM erred because it "impermissibly shifted the burden of
proving harm to those claiming a right to exercise atraditional and customary
native Hawaiian practice".1' The Court concluded that COWRM failed to
adhere to the proper burden of proof standard to maintain the protection of
Native Hawaiian traditional and customary gathering rights in discharging
its public trust obligation.l12
IV. JUDICIALLY DEFINED CRITERIA FOR CUSTOMARY AND TRADITIONAL
PRACTICES
A. Balancing the Interests of Property Owners and Practitioners
In reviewing customary rights claims, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has
articulated a balancing test in which the retention of a Hawaiian tradition is
determined first by deciding if a custom has continued in a particular area and,
second, by balancing the respective interests of the practitioner and possible
harm to the landowner.143
In Kalipi, the Court did not need to implement this balancing test since it
found that there was insufficient evidence to show that such rights should
accrue to someone who did not reside in the ahupua'a in which such rights
are claimed. The Court also noted, however, that testimony had shown that
139 Ibid. at 443, 83 P.3d at 706 (quoting Conclusion of Law No. 29 entered by the State
Commission on water Resource Management in the contested case hearing decision that
formed the basis for this appeal).
140 Ibid.
141 116 Hawai'i 481, 507, 174 P.3d320, 346 (2007).
142 Ibid, at 509, 174 P.3d at 348.
143 Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 10, 656 P.2d at 750-51 (citations omitted).
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there was a range of traditional practices - including the gathering of items
not included in Haw. Rev. Stat. section 7-1 and use of lands for spiritual and
other purposes - that required the use of undeveloped property of others. The
Court then concluded that where such practices, "without harm to anyone",
have continued, section 1-1 ensures their continuance "so long as no actual
harm is done thereby".144 Thus, for the Kalipi Court, the balancing test focused
on whether the customary practice harmed another's interest.
In Pele, the Court characterised Kalipi as upholding rights under Haw. Rev.
Stat. section 1-1 to:'1'
enter undeveloped lands owned by others to practice continuously exercised
access and gathering rights necessary for subsistence, cultural or religious
purposes so long as no actual harm was done by the practice.
Subsequently, in PASH, the Court amplified on the test, stating that the
"reasonable exercise of ancient Hawaiian usage is entitled to protection under
article XII, section 7", although: 146
the balance of interests and harms clearly favors a right of exclusion for
private property owners as against persons pursuing non-traditionalpractices
or exercising otherwise valid customary rights in an unreasonable manner.
Similarly, when the PASH Court reached its landmark conclusion that "the
western concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawai'i",147
it immediately attempted to alleviate fears of private property owners by
stressing "the non-confrontational aspects of traditional Hawaiian culture"
which "should minimize potential disturbances".148 The Court then emphasised
that "unreasonable or non-traditional uses are not permitted under today's
ruling". 149
Consequently, in balancing the interests of practitioners and private property
owners, the Court has focused on (1) whether the practice is indeed customary
and traditional; (2) whether the practice is exercised in a reasonable manner;
and (3) whether the practice causes harm to another's recognised interest. The
question of harm to another's interest is closely related to whether a customary
practice is exercised in a reasonable manner.
144 Ibid, at 10, 656 P2d at 750 (emphasis added).
145 Pele, 73 Haw. at 618, 837 P.2d at 1270 (emphasis added).
146 P4SH, 79 Hawai'i at 442, 903 P.2d at 1263 (emphasis added).
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid, at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268.
149 Ibid.
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In a footnote in PASH, the Court highlighted three aspects of the doctrine of
custom in Hawai'i: (1) a custom is consistent when measured against other
customs; (2) a custom is certain if it can be objectively defined and applied;
and (3) reasonableness concerns the manner in which an otherwise valid
customary right is exercised - "even if an acceptable rationale cannot be
assigned, the custom is still recognised as long as there is no 'good legal reason'
against it." 1o Thus, the reasonableness of the manner or method employed in
the exercise of a valid practice determines whether it warrants constitutional
protection, but the balance tips toward reasonableness as long as there is no
good legal reason against recognising the custom.III
B. Practice Established by 25 November 1892
Based on the enactment of Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1, traditional and
customary practices in Hawai'i must be established in practice by 25
November 1892.152
C. Customary Rights not Limited by Tenancy
Although Kalipi appeared to hold that customary and traditional rights were
associated with residency within the ahupua'a, Pele clarified that Article
XII, section 7, protects customary rights exercised beyond the boundaries
of the ahupua'a in which a Native Hawaiian resides where those rights were
customarily and traditionally exercised in that manner. '1 In PASH, the Court
reaffirmed its holding in Pele and declared that "common law rights ordinarily
associated with tenancy do not limit customary rights existing under the laws
of this state". 14
D. Definition of Native Hawaiian
In PASH the Court rejected an interpretation of Pele that would have limited
protection under Article XII, section 7, to those Native Hawaiians of 50 per
cent or more Hawaiian ancestry. The PASH Court held that descendants of
Native Hawaiians who inhabited the islands prior to 1778 who assert valid
customary and traditional Hawaiian rights are entitled to protection, regardless
of their blood quantum.15'
150 Ibid, at 447, 903 P2d at 1269 n.39.
151 See D Kapua'ala Sproat "Comment: The Backlash against P4SH: Legislativ e Attempts to
Restrict Native Hawaiian Rights" (1998 Summer/Fall) 20 U Haw L Rev 321 at 342.
152 PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 447, 903 P2d at 1268.
153 Pele, 73 Haw. at 620, 837 P2d at 1272.
154 PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 448, 903 P.2d at 1269.
155 Ibid, at 449, 903 P2d at 1270.
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E. Continued Existence of a Customary Practice
Both Kalipi and Pele implied that a customary practice., in order to be valid,
must have been exercised continuously.1' 6 Moreover, in the earlier case of State
v Zinring,157 the Court seemed to reject the idea that customary practices had
carried over into a private property regime. PASH characterised the relevant
language in Zimring as dicta and specifically stated that the "ancient usage
of lands practiced by Hawaiians did, in fact, carry over into the new system
of property rights" and that "fee simple title in Hawai'i is limited by the
sovereign's authority to regulate its use".'15 This analysis led the Court to
conclude that that the "right of each ahupua'a tenant to exercise traditional and
customary practices remains intact, notwithstanding arguable abandonment
of a particular site".15
F. Undeveloped/Ful)ly Developed Land
In the Kalipi case, the Hawai'i Supreme Court imposed a restriction on the
exercise of traditional and customary under Haw. Rev. Stat. section 7-1,
determining that such practices could only be exercised on "undeveloped
lands within the ahupuaa". 160 The Court acknowledged that the undeveloped
land limitation "is not, of course, found within [Haw. Rev. Stat. 7-1]".161
The Court added the restriction to avoid conflicts between practitioners and
landowners and characterised it as necessary to prevent residents from going
"anywvhere within the ahupuaa, including fully developed property, to gather
the enumerated items". 162 Such a result, the Court said, "would so conflict
with understandings of property, and potentially lead to such disruption"
that it would be absurd and therefore not what was intended by the statute's
framers.163 The Kalipi Court also expressed its opinion that such a result would
conflict with the "traditional Hawaiian way of life in which cooperation and
non-interference with the well-being of other residents were integral parts of
the culture". 164
156 Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 11-12, 656 P.2d at 751-52; Pele, 73 Haw. at619, 837 P.2dat 1271.
157 State v Zimring, 58 Haw. 106, 566 P.2d 725 (1977). In Zimring, the Court determined that
lava extensions are owned by the State and rejected the trial Court's determination that
Hawaiian usage was always to give lava-extended shorelines to the abutting landowner. In
doing so, the Zimring Court questioned the relevance of customary usage prior to institution
of a fee simple land ownership system in Hawai'i.
158 R4SH, 79 Hawai'i at 449-450, 903 P.2d at 1270-71.
159 Ibid, at 45, 903 P2d at 1271.
160 Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 7, 656 P.2d at 749.
161 Ibid, at 8, 656 P2d at 750.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
136
Hawaiian Custom in Hawnai'i State Law
In Pele, the Court did not specifically comment on this requirement, but
implicitly applied it to customary practices recognised under Haw. Rev. Stat.
section 1-1.165 However, inPASH, the Court declined the "temptation to place
undue emphasis on non-Hawaiian principles of land ownership" and elected
"not to scrutinize the various gradations in property use that fall between the
terms 'undeveloped' and 'fully developed'". 66 Instead, the Court emphasised
the need to make determinations on a case-by-case basis. However, the PASH
Court also stated that, "once land has reached the point of 'full development'
it may be inconsistent"'167 to allow the exercise of Native Hawaiian rights. On
its face, this language indicated that there could be instances in which fully
developed land might be subject to the exercise ofNative Hawaiian customary
and traditional rights.
Subsequently, the Court clarified this statement. In the Hanapi case, the Court
held that:16
if property is deemed "fully developed," i.e., lands zoned and used for
residential purposes with existing dwellings, improvements, and infrastructure,
it is always "inconsistent" to permit the practice of traditional and customary
native Hawaiian rights on such property.
In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that residential property is only
one example of fully developed property and that there may be other such
examples.169 In accordance with the holding in PASH however, the Court
reserved the question as to the status of Native Hawaiian rights on property
that is "less than fully developed".10
G. Establishing Customary and Traditional Practices
Of the cases decided by the Hawai'i Supreme Court, only Hanapi offers
concrete guidance on what is required to establish a customary and traditional
practice. In Hanapi, the Court first noted that some customary and traditional
native Hawaiian rights are codified either inArticle XII, section?, of the State
165 See Pele, 73 Haw. at 621, 837 P.2d at 1273, stating that upon a showing that Vao Kele 0 Puna
was atraditional gathering area utilised by tenants of the abutting ahupua'a, PDF members
may have a right to enter the undeveloped areas to exercise their traditional practices. PDF
based its customary and traditional rights claim on Haw. Rev. Stat. 1 -1 and Art. XII ,§ 7
of the Hawai'i Constitution. Ibid, at 618, 837 P.2d at 1270.
166 PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 450, 903 P.2d at 1271.
167 Ibid.
168 Hanapi 89 Hawai'i at 186-87, 970 P.2d at 494-95.
169 Ibid, at 187, 970 P.2d at 495, n. 10.
170 Ibid, at 187 970 P2d at 495.
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constitution or in Haw. Rev. Stat. sections 1-1 and 7-1.' The Court stated,
however, "The fact that the claimed right is not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution or statutes, does not preclude further inquiry concerning other
traditional and customary practices that have existed."172
In Hanapi., the defendant, although testifying to his own practice and the
basis for the practice, did not offer an explanation of the "history or origin of
the claimed right. Nor was there a description of the 'ceremonies' involved
in the healing process."' - The Court in Hanapi believed that the defendants'
testimony and the testimony of his wife, standing alone, were insufficient to
meet the burden of proving a customary and traditional right. The Court stated
that to establish the existence of a traditional or customary Native Hawaiian
practice, there must be an "adequate foundation in the record connecting the
claimed right to a firmly rooted traditional or customary native Hawaiian
practice".174 According to the Court, such a foundation can be made through
testimony of experts or kama'aina witnesses as proof of ancient Hawaiian
tradition, custom and usage.'7
What is less clear is to what extent Native Hawaiian practitioners can use
modem means and methods -for instance a motorboat for fishing or a chainsaw
to fell a tree - to exercise customary and traditional rights. Although the
Hawai'i Supreme Court has never been called upon to decide these kinds of
issues,"' federal Court cases interpreting American Indian treaty rights may
provide some guidance. Several federal Court decisions appear to support the
use of modern technology while native peoples are engaged in traditional and
customary practices. These decisions affirmed the right of tribes to employ
171 Ibid, at 186, 970 P2d at 494. Notwithstanding the Court's statement, arguably only 1-aw.
Rev. Stat. § 7-1 actually enumerates customary and traditional rights.
172 Ibid, at 186, 970 P.2d at 494.
173 Ibid, at 187, 970 P.2d at 495.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid, at n.12.
176 One state trial Court judge determined, with respect to a claim of customary and traditional
fishing rights, that:
Method is relevant to claimed traditional and customary rights. Fishing and gathering
lose their traditional and customary nature when performed with modern technology
that: (a) substantially replaces human dexterity, energy or propulsion (e.g. manual
harvesting, hand retrieval of lines and nets, swimming, rowing) or natural energy
or propulsion (e.g. surfing, sailing) with engines or motors; or (b) replaces and
substantially extends the scope or intensity of traditional methods (e.g. miles long
synthetic lines vs. traditionally made lines). A difference in amount can be a difference
in kind.
Kelly v 1250 Oceanside Partners (Civ. No. 00- 1-0192K, Findings of Fact; Conclusions of
Law and Order With Respect to Counts II and V in the Fifth Amended Complaint, October
21, 2002), Conclusion of Law No. 4.
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modem boats, nets and other techniques while exercising their treaty fishing
rights.mV For example, United States T Washington"s discussed the fact that the
treaty tribes utilise modern techniques to fish and some, such as the Makah,
even desired assurances in negotiating their treaties that they would not be
bound to aboriginal techniques and methods in fishing. Ultimately, the Court
determined that the "treaty tribes may utilize improvements in traditional
fishing techniques, methods and gear subject only to restrictions necessary
to preserve and maintain the resource"."'
Similarly, there are federal statutes, including the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972,1s0 which provide specific exemptions forAlaska Natives, allowing
them to take protected marine mammals such as seals, whales, and sea otters
for subsistence or for use in traditional native handicrafts. These statutes as
well as cases interpreting them may provide some guidance on this issue."'1 The
answer, however, is likely to lie in a case-by-case determination by Hawai'i
Courts as to whether the particular means or method employed is reasonable
and whether its use is harmful to another's interest.
Hawaiian scholar Davianna Pomaika'i McGregor, who has extensively studied
traditional and customary practices in rural communities, has suggested some
behavioural factors that should be considered in determining whether practices,
in this modern age, are firmly linked to custom. She states: 182
These rules of behaviour are tied to cultural beliefs and values regarding the
respect of the 'aina (land), the virtue of sharing and not taking too much, and
a wholistic perspective of organisms and ecosystems that emphasises balance
and coexistence.
She also notes: m1
177 United States v Washington, 384 E Sipp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 R2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 44,48 (1976). See also Puyallup Tribe v Department of
Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Sohappy v Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969), aff 'd. and
remanded, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 260
(W'.D. Mich. 1979); Peterson v Christensen, 455 F Supp. 1095, 1099 (E.D. Wis. 1978);
Grand Traverse Band of Chippewa and Ottawa Indians v Director, Michigan Department
of Natural Resources, 971 F Supp. 282, 289 (W'.D. Mich. 1995), aff'd. 141 R3d 635 (6th
Cir. 1998), rehrg denied, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13638 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1040
(1998).
178 U.S. v Washington, 384 E Supp. 3 12 , 363-64 (W.D. Wasli. 1974), aff'd, 520 R2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
179 Ibid, at 402.
180 16 U.S.C. § 1361-1421h (2000).
181 lbid, § 1371(b).
182 McGregor, above note 3, 30 Hawn. J. of Hist. at 16 (1996).
183 lbid, at 16.
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In communities where traditional Hawaiian customs and practices have
continued to be practiced, the 'ohana respects and cares for the surrounding
natural resources. They only use and take what is needed. They allow the natural
resources to reproduce. They share what is gathered with family and neighbors.
Other factors include: protecting the knowledge that has been passed down
from generation to generation; acting with purpose and mindfulness when
engaged in the particular activity; respecting the traditional areas of other
families and practitioners; and honouring the gods and deities that guard a
particular resource.18 4
H. Impact on Private Propert) Interests
In P4SH, the Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected the developer's argument that
the recognition of traditional Hawaiian rights beyond those established in
Kalipi and Pele would fundamentally alter its property rights and result in a
judicial taking.1'5 The Court summarily disposed of the argument., noting that
a judicial decision constitutes an unconstitutional taking of private property
if it "involve[s] retroactive alteration of state law such as would constitute an
unconstitutional taking of private property""' and stating that the argument
placed undue reliance on Western understandings of property law "not
universally applicable in Hawai'i". 187 The Court also stated that custom and
usage have always been part of the State's laws."'s
The PASH Court then turned to the question of whether a "regulatory taking"
- a taking that occurs when government application of a law to a particular
landowner denies all economically beneficial use of the property without
compensation - might result from recognition of traditional and customary
rights during the process of obtaining permits to develop land.'8 9 The PASH
Court agreed with the developer that the issue was premature since it was
impossible to know, at that stage of the case, whether and what types of
conditions might be placed by the regulatory agency on development in order
to protect customary and traditional rights.190
184 Ibid, at 16-18.
185 P4SH, 79 Hawai'i at 451, 903 P.2d at 1272.
186 Ibid (citing Bonelli Cattle Co. v Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 337 n.2, 38 L. Ed. 2d 526, 94 S.
Ct. 517 (1973) (Stewart J, dissenting)).
187 Ibid
188 Ibid
189 Ibid at 452, 903 P.2d at 1273.
190 Ibid
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Although the PASH case has been criticised as a radical departure from prior
Hawai'i law, because of the ripeness doctrine,' 9' it can only be challenged in
federal Court once it has been applied in a specific factual situation. As one
commentator has noted,192
[ulntil there is some specific permit condition imposed or some denial of a
permit based on PASH, or until some specific claimant's individual demand
for access is adjudicated, there will likely be reluctance on the part of the U.S.
Supreme Court to become involved.
Since the PASH decision, few cases have made their way to the Hawai'i
Supreme Court relating to customary and traditional rights - Ka Pa'akai
and Waiola specifically deal with the permitting process and neither one
has resulted in a federal Court challenge to the Court's customary rights
jurisprudence.193
Soon after the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision in P4SH, calls came from
the business and private-property rights sectors of the community to define
and regulate customary and traditional rights.19 4 In 1997, bills were introduced
in the Hawai'i State Legislature that would have regulated customary
and traditional rights.9 5 Senate Bill 8, for instance, instituted a process of
determining and registering all traditional and customary uses exercised on a
parcel of land. House Bill 1920. on the other hand, created a declaratory cause
of action that could be initiated in circuit Court to "determine the nature and
extent of customary and traditional practices in land". Both bills failed, due
in large part to opposition from the Native Hawaiian community.
191 See Paul M Sullivan "Customary Revolutions: The Law of Custom and the Conflict of
Traditions in Hawai'i" (1998 Summer/Fall) 20 U Hawv L Rev 99 at 126-33 for a discussion
of federal Court cases in which the argument has been made that the Hawai'i Supreme
Courts' decisions in specific cases resulted in judicial taking of property and the resulting
federal decisions finding such claims not ripe for review.
192 Ibid, at 161.
193 See M Casey Jarman and Robert RM Verchick, "Beyond the 'Courts of the Conqueror':
Balancing Private and Cultural Property Rights underHawai'i Law"(2003, Spring)5 Scholar
201 for a discussion of the Ka Pa'akai case on remand to the Land Use Commission and
application of the Ka Pa'akai analysis in other proceedings.
194 See, for example, Kenneth R Kupchak "Native-Use Rights to Affect Permits" Pacific
Business News (Hawai'i, 16 April 1996) calling for a comprehensive solution and the
creation of a Native Rights Commission to determine such rights.
195 See D Kapua'ala Sproat, above note 151, (Summer/Fall 1998) 20 U Haw L Rev at 353 for
a description of these legislative efforts and analysis of the bills in relation to the Hawai'i
Supreme Court's decisions.
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One outcome of these legislative efforts, however, was the establishment of a
PASH-Kohanaiki Study Group, 9 6 which released a report on its deliberations
in January 1998. The report surveyed the issues raised by the PASH decision
from various perspectives including those of landowners/business interests,
Native Hawaiian practitioners and government agencies. The landowner/
business perspective was that a resolution was needed that would (1) protect
and perpetuate traditional rights without diminishing private property
owner rights, (2) provide predictability, certainty and finality, and (3) foster
stewardship of the land. Specific concerns noted were the impact of the
decision on title insurance and development financing, the possible increased
regulatory burden on those wishing to develop properties, and the potential
liability of landowners for injury to those accessing private property to practise
customary and traditional rights. An overarching concern expressed was that
the PASH decision had the potential to "undermine the State's investment
climate" with resulting negative consequences throughout the State's economy.
More than 15 years after the PASH decision, however, it does not appear that
the concerns and fears expressed by business and private property rights
advocates have actually affected real estate transactions or Hawai'i's economy.
V. CUSTOM IN OTHER STATE LAws
Although it is not possible to do a complete survey of other Hawai'i laws
incorporating or protecting Hawaiian custom, several important examples
indicate the extent to which custom plays a role in Hawai'i law. These
examples include water rights, the protection of Hawaiian human remains
or iwi kupuna, and enactment of a law allowing parents to keep the 'iewe or
placenta of a newborn.
A. Hawaiian Water Rights 98
In ancient Hawai'i, water or wai was a procreative force and the physical
embodiment of the god Kane.199 In addition to defining social and cultural
development because of the importance of water to the growth of kalo or taro,
the Hawaiian staple plant., how water was shared and managed was literally
the basis for law. For growth and to prevent disease, kalo requires constantly
196 See H.R. No. 197, H.D. 1, Regular Session of 1997, Nineteenth State Legislature, State of
Hawai'i.
197 P4SH-Kohanaiki Study Group Report at 9 (January 1998).
198 For an extended discussion of Hawaiian water rights la-w see John Castle and Alan Murakami
in Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie (ed) Native Hawaiian Rights Handbook (University of
Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 1991) Chapter 7 ["Handbook"].
199 ES Craighill Handy and Elizabeth Green Handy, Native Planters in Old Hawaii (Bishop
Museum Press, Honolulu, 1972) at 64-65.
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flowing cool, fresh water. Hawaiians constructed complex systems of 'auwai or
irrigation ditches and developed a management system that apportioned water
among lo'i kalo or taro fields next to a ditch or stream. 200 After water flowed
through the lo'i, it was returned to the 'auwai or stream to flow downstream
to the next lo'i and eventually to the sea. On the lo'i banks, kalo farmers grew
other crops like banana, sugar cane and yam. 20 1 This system, which served the
ancient Hawaiians well, continues today in rural communities throughout the
islands. Kalo is still a staple food for the Hawaiian community and indeed, in
the Hawaiian creation story, kalo and Hawaiians share a common ancestor.202
Thus, kalo is viewed as the older sibling of the Hawaiian people. Kanawai
(relating to water) is the word for law in the Hawaiian language and, as
commentators have noted, this term reflects Hawaiian society's203
focus on managing the shared use of water. Hawaiians deemed water and other
natural resources a public good. The entire community, regardless of social
rank, dutifully respected this principle and did not lightly suffer any violaters.
Hawai'i water law today is a mix of Hawaiian traditional concepts, common
law based on those concepts, and constitutional and statutory provisions
incorporating those concepts. While it is beyond the scope of this article to
examine Hawai'i water law in detail, several general principles -appurtenant
water rights, riparian uses, and the public trust nature of water - show the
extent to which Hawaiian tradition has been incorporated into State law. In
addition, the Hawai'i Water Code contains specific provisions protecting
traditional and customary rights.
Early Hawai'i case law recognised appurtenant water rights based on the
ancient Hawaiian agricultural system. Through ancient custom, the right to use
water for irrigating taro lands became attached or "appurtenant" to the lands.
This customary right became a legal right when land titles were awarded 204
with the quantity of water allowed tied to the amount customarily used at and
immediately prior to a land award during the Mahele process. 205 The earliest
Hawai'i water rights case established this principle. In Peck v Bailey (1867),206
200 See Antonio Perry "Hawaiian Water Rights" in Thomas G Thrum (ed) Hawaiian Annual &
Almanac for 1913 (1912) at 95 for a description of traditional Hawaiian water usage and
management.
201 Handy and Handy, above note 199, at 92-93 (1972).
202 David Malo, Hawaiian Antiquities (Bishop Museum Press, Honolulu, 1903) at 320.
203 D Kapua'ala Sproat and Isaac H Moriwake "Ke Kalo Pa'a o Waiahole: Use of the Public
Trust as a Tool for Environmental Advocacy" in C Rechtschaffen and D Antolini (eds)
Creative Common Law Strategies for Protecting the Environment (Environment Law
Institute, WAashington, 2007) at 249.
204 Peck v Bailey, 8 Haw. 658, 661 (1867).
205 Carter v Territory, 24 Haw. 47, 66 (1917); Territory v Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 383 (1930).
206 8 Haw. 658 (1867).
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a dispute arose between two landowners within the ahupuaa of Wailuku on
Maui, with the plaintiff claiming a superior right based on title derived from
the konohiki of the ahupua'a.2 07 The Court rejected the claim, stating, "[i]f
any of the lands were entitled to water by immemorial usage, this right was
included in the conveyance as an appurtenance" .208 Consequently, each party
was limited to ancient appurtenant rights to use water for its lands, neither
party having any superior rights. Since the Peck decision, the doctrine of
appurtenant rights has become a basic tenet of Hawaii water law. 209
In AIcBtyde Sugar Co. v Robinson,210 the Hawai'i Supreme Court clarified
Hawai'i law to hold that waters flowing in natural watercourses belong to
the State of Hawai'i. In IcBtyde, the Court looked to the Mahele and its
implementing laws to examine what Kamehameha III intended to convey
in granting fee simple titles. The Board of Land Commissioners, which was
responsible for hearing and determining land claims, adopted certain principles
including the principle that the king's prerogatives as head of the nation - his
"sovereign prerogatives - could not be conveyed. One of these sovereign
prerogatives was "to encourage and even to enforce the usufruct of lands
for the common good".211 The AlcBryde Court reasoned that the right to use
water was one of the most important usufructs of land. The principles showed
the king's intent to reserve the right to use water to himself as sovereign for
the common good. Thus, no right to private ownership of water had been
conveyed with any land title grant as a result of the Mahele process. 212 The
Court held that the State. as successor to the King, owned all waters flowing
in natural watercourses.
In McBr}yde, the Court also pointed to section 7 of the Kuleana Act of 1850,
which guarantees the right to "drinking water and running water". The Court
said that the term "running water" must have meant water flowing in natural
watercourses, since artificial watercourses were exempted from the statute.
Pointing to the influence of the missionaries from Massachusetts, the Court
207 Ibid, at 659.
208 lbid, at 661.
209 'ells A Hutchins The Hawaiian System of Water Rights (US Dept ofAgriculture and the
Board of Water Supply, City and County of Honolulu, Honolulu, 1946) at 103.
210 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1975), afin't on rehearing
211 Ibid, at 186, 504 P.2dat 1338, quoting from 2 Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925app. at 2124,
2128 (1925).
212 lbid, at 187, 504 P2d at 1339.
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found parallels to the English common law doctrine of riparianism, which
Massachusetts had adopted.213 Consequently, the Court held that a landowner
adjoining a natural watercourse had riparian water rights.
Subsequently, the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Reppun v Board of Water
Supply214 reaffirmed the doctrine, specifically highlighting the needs of
Hawaiian kalo farmers and the shared use of water resources in traditional
Hawaiian society:215
First, the doctrine is consistent with the needs of native commoners at the time
of the law's passage. Taro, the predominant agricultural crop, grew best where
a steady flow of running water, most of which could be subsequently utilised
by lower riparian users, occurred; the cultivation of taro took place principally
upon riparian lands; and grants to commoners were restricted to lands they had
in fact cultivated. Second, the principles underlying the doctrine are consistent
with those that appear to pervade the native system of water allocation and
preexisting civil law inasmuch as: "title" to the water was not equated with the
right to use; each person's right to use was a "correlative" nature; and rights
to use were predicated upon beneficial application of the water to the land.
In 1978. the Hawai'i State Constitution was amended to expressly declare
that "[a]ll public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit
of its people".216 Another amendment reiterated the State's "obligation to
protect, control and regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the
benefit of its people".217 This amendment also provided for the creation of a
water resources agency that would, among other things., "establish criteria for
water use priorities while assuring appurtenant rights and existing correlative
and riparian uses and establish procedures for regulating all uses of Hawaii's
water resources".218
213 The cases cited by the Court indicated that natural water courses were publici juris; meaning
that such waters were public and common to the extent that all who had a right of access
could make reasonable use of them. Ibid, at 186-87, 504 P2d at 1338-1339.
214 65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982), cent. denied, 471 U.S. 1014 (1984).
215 Ibid, at 545, 656 P2d at 67 (1982).
216 Haw. Const. art Xl, § 1.
217 Haw. Const. art. X, §7.
218 Ibid.
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In 1987, the State Legislature adopted the State Water Code. The Code ensures
that "traditional and customary rights of ahupuaa tenants ... shall not be
abridged or denied" in implementing its provisions and states that:219
such traditional and customary rights shall include, but not be limited to, the
cultivation or propagation of taro on one's own kuleana and the gathering of
hihiwai, opae, o'opu, limu, thatch, ti leaf, aho cord, and medicinal plants for
subsistence, cultural, and religious purposes.
In a landmark water rights decision interpreting the State Constitution and
the Water Code, the Hawai'i Supreme Court gave substance to the public
trust doctrine in Hawai'i.220 Although the decision contains many significant
and groundbreaking determinations, for our purposes, the most relevant is
the Court's recognition that "Native Hawaiian and traditional and customary
rights" are public trust purposes.221
B. Protection ofAncestral Remains222
Values and customs related to death "are deeply ingrained in Hawaiian culture,
calling for utmost respect and reverence". 223 For traditional Hawaiians, the
bones and the spirit of a person are connected and the spirit remains near the
bones or iwi following death. The burial area is a sacred place, particularly
because the life force or mana of the deceased person is infused into the
place of burial. The mana of the deceased is imparted to the ahupua'a and
eventually to the entire island. The iwi of the deceased and the burial site
were so sacred that if either was disturbed, the ability of the spirit to join the
'aumlkua or ancestors in eternity was in jeopardy. This then could result in
injury and spiritual trauma to the living descendants of the deceased person.
219 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 174C-101(c). HThTwai are "endemic grainy snails" eaten by Native
Hawaiians; 'opae is the "general name shrimp"; 'o'opu is the "general name for certain
families of fish ... some in salt water near the shore, others in fresh water, and some said to
be in either fresh or salt water"; limu is a "general name for all kinds of plants living under
water, both fresh and salt, also algae growing in any damp place in the air, as on the ground,
on rocks, and on other plants"; aho means "line, cord. lashing" (Hawaiian Dictionary).
Section 174C-101(d) also provides that the "appurtenant water rights of kuleana and taro
lands, along with those traditional and customary rights assured in this section, shall not
be diminished or extinguished by a failure to apply for or to receive a permit under this
chapter."
220 See, generally, Sproat and Moriwake, above note 203, for a discussion of the public trust
doctrine in Halvai'i water cases.
221 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 137 n.34, 9 P3d 409, 449 n.34 (2000).
222 This section is based on information from Chapter 13 in Handbook, above note 198, written
by Edward HalealohaAyau.
223 Ibid, at 245. See MK Pukui, LW Haerting, C Lee Nana I Ke Kumu (Look to the Source)
Vol. I (Hui Hanai, Honolulu, 1972) at 115-118, 195-196 for discussion of Hawaiian concepts
of death and treatment of human remains.
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In 1988, during the construction of a large resort on the island of Maui near
Honokahua Bay, Hawaiian remains were removed to make room for the new
hotel. Although there certainly had been other instances where remains had
been discovered, in the past, iwi kupuna or ancestral remains had been dug up
and historic sites paved over for development with impunity. At Honokahua,
however, when local news accounts began to report the exhumation of more
than 1,100 skeletal remains, Hawaiians were outraged by the desecration.224
They mobilised and held a 24-hour vigil at the state capitol. Ultimately, the
developer agreed to move the hotel inland, the disturbed 'iwi kupuna were
reinterred, and the burial area was set apart.225
The activities at Honokahua sparked a demand for legislative protection for
Hawaiian burial sites. In 1990, the Hawai'i State legislature passed a burials
law giving Hawaiian burial sites - especially those with large numbers of
remains - additional protection.226 The law establishes island burial councils
for each of the major islands, with representatives from both the Native
Hawaiian community and large landowner interests, with Hawaiian interests
constituting a majority on the councils.22 The councils assist the State
Historic Preservation Division (SHPD) with the inventory and identification
of unmarked prehistoric and historic Hawaiian burial sites. The councils also
make recommendations on the treatment and protection of iwi ku-puna.
Amajor role of the councils is to "determine the preservation or relocation of
previously identified native Hawaiian burial sites". 228 The law states that "[a]ll
burial sites are significant and shall be preserved in place until compliance
with this section is met... ".229 The law also establishes criteria that the councils
must consider, including giving higher priority to in situ preservation to>0
areas with a concentration of skeletal remains, or prehistoric or historic burials
associated with important individuals and events, or that are within a context
of historic properties, or have known lineal descendants[.]
Before a State project affecting unmarked prehistoric or historic Hawaiian
burials begins, SHPD must be notified for review and comment. Similarly,
for projects located on private property, before any agency of the State or its
political subdivisions approves a project involving a permit, licence, land
224 Handbook, above note 198, at 245.
225 Kanani Nihipali "Stone by Stone, Bone by Bone: Rebuilding the Hawaiian Nation in the
Illusion of Reality" (2002, Spring) 34 Ariz St LJ 27.
226 Act 306, Haw. Sess. Laws. 1990 (codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. Chap. 6-E).
227 Haw. Rev. Stat. 6E-43.5.
228 Ibid, 6E-43.5(f)(1).
229 Ibid, § 6E-43(b).
230 Ibid.
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use change or other entitlement for a use that may affect burials, the agency
must advise SHPD. 231 If an archaeological inventory survey reveals evidence
of burials on the relevant property, the appropriate island burial council has
jurisdiction to determine whether to preserve in place or relocate the remains.
If Hawaiian remains are "inadvertently" discovered during construction,
SHPD has jurisdiction to decide whether to preserve in situ or relocate; in
making that decision, SHPD must use the same criteria as the councils212 In
either instance, a mitigation plan will be developed by the SHPD or with its
concurrence. Preservation in place should be the mitigation plan if there is
no threat to the iwi. The landowner or developer is usually responsible for
executing the mitigation plan.21
On the other hand, if removal is necessary due to imminent harn to the iwi,
burial council members are notified and allowed to oversee the process. SHPD
determines the place of relocation after consulting with the property owner,
lineal descendants and the council. Lineal and cultural descendants may
perform traditional ceremonies during relocation of the iwi.234
The burials law defines "burial site" to address concerns that human remains
should not be classified as ordinary property and that the area surrounding a
burial is sacred.235 Thus, burial sites are "unique class[es] of historic property".
Moreover. under the law. the State of Hawai'i holds title to known Hawaiian
burial sites "in trust for preservation or disposition by ... [Native Hawaiian]
descendants".236 Finally, the State cannot transfer a burial site without
consulting the appropriate island burial council.>
The success of the burial law depends on how well SHPD implements the law
and whether all parties - particularly developers and landowners - cooperate.
Indeed, with the large number of development activities in Hawai'i, the law
can only be successful if developers and landowners are responsive to the
complex cultural, spiritual and legal issues involved. Recent controversies
- in urban Honolulu and on the island of Kaua'i - indicate that the process
envisioned by the law may not be working. Several lawsuits are currently
pending in State Courts dealing with the interpretation of the law in an urban
setting where permits have been granted for development, allegedly without
231 Ibid, § 6E-42.
232 Ibid, § 6E-43.6(c)(3).
233 Ibid, § 6E-43.6(e).
234 Ibid, § 6E-43.6(f).
235 Ibid, § 6E-2.
236 Ibid, § 6E-7(c).
237 Ibid, § 6E-7(d).
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following the careful review process established in the law.238 This means,
for instance, that in one case where remains of over 60 kupuna have been
discovered, they are classified as "inadvertently discovered" and jurisdiction
over whether to preserve in place or remove to another location has fallen to
the SHPD rather than the O'ahu Island Burials Council. 2 39
C. Protection for Customs Related to Birth
Just as customary practices related to death are culturally and spiritually
significant to Native Hawaiians, so too are those relating to birth. The proper
care of both the piko or umbilical cord, and 'iewe or placenta, of a newborn
increases the child's health and well-being throughout its life. Important rituals
associated with both the piko and 'iewe connected a child to its homeland.
The piko would be carefully guarded and then placed in a special reserved
place. Hawaiian scholar Mary Kawena Pukui stated2?0
In every district on every island were places, usually stones, especially reserved
for the piko. Wailoa was one on the Big Island ... another was Mokuola. Ola
means 'life' and loa means 'long'. Mothers took the cords to stones with names
like these so their babies would live long, healthy lives.
Traditionally, Hawaiians cleaned the 'iewe of blood to ensure that the child's
eyes would not be weak or sore. The 'iewe was later buried. usually under a
tree, to keep the child connected to its home and to prevent the child's spirit
from wandering homeless or hungry after death. 241
In 2005, the State of Hawai'i Department of Health began enforcing a policy
that classified the 'iewe as infectious waste. Previously, hospitals and doctors
had given the 'iewe to a mother upon request. A Native Hawaiian couple filed
a lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Hawaii contesting the
policy as a violation the US Constitution's provision guaranteeing religious
238 See, for example, Kaleikini v Thielen, 124 Hawai'i 1, 237 P.3d 1067 (2010); Vicki Viotti
"Wal-Mart Asked to Delay Store Opening" Honolulu Advertiser (Hawai'i, 3 October
2004) <http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2004/Oct/03/li Iil5a.html> (last visited
5 November 2011); see Charles Kauluwehi Maxwell "Kakakaka: Apply the Law to Protect
Naue iwi kupcuna"Ka Wai Ola o OHA (Hawai'i, June 2009) <www.oha.org/kwo/loa/2009/06/
storyl3.php> (last visited 5 November 2011) for discussion of a recent controversy on
Kaua'i.
239 For a discussion on the Hawai'i burials law and controversies surrounding its implementation
in urban Honolulu, see Rona Bolante "Bones of Contention" -lonolulu Magazine (Hawai'i,
November 2007) <www.honolulimagazine.com/Honolulu-Magazine/November-2007/
Bones-of-Contention/> (last visited 5 November 2011).
240 Nana IKe Kumu Vol. I, above note 223, at 184.
241 Ibid.
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freedom and of Hawaiian traditional and customary practices. 242 Once the
mother had given birth, the federal Court ordered the 'iewe to be frozen and
stored while the suit was pending. Subsequently, the 'iewe disappeared from
the hospital and the Court dismissed the lawsuit. 243
Native Hawaiian families then sought relief through the State Legislature
and, in 2006, the Legislature passed and Governor signed a law that allows
a hospital to release the 'iewe to the mother or her designee after a negative
finding of infectious or hazardous disease .244 A draft of the bill stated that
"the State has the obligation to assure that religious and cultural beliefs and
practices are not impeded" without a strong reason .25 The final committee
reviewing the bill noted that "the rich ethnic and cultural practices of Native
Hawaiian traditions are essential to sustaining the Hawaiian culture, and
need protection".246 According to news reports, no other US state has laws
addressing the cultural need to take placentas from hospitals.247
VI. CONCLUSION -AN OL ALOHA
In Hawai'i, state law encourages legislators, judges and policy-makers to
apply the "Aloha Spirit" by providing:248
In exercising their power on behalf of the people and in fulfillment of their
responsibilities, obligations and service to the people, the legislature, governor,
lieutenant governor, executive officers of each department, the chief justice,
associate justices, and judges of the appellate, circuit, and district Courts
may contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration to the
"Aloha Spirit."
242 N.S. and E.K.N. v State offawai'i, U.S. D. Ct. for the District of Hawaii, Civ. No. 05-00405
HG, Complaint (24 June 2005).
243 Ibid, Minute Order (5 August 2005).
244 Act 12, Haw. Sess. Laws (2006).
245 Twenty-Third Legislature, State of Hawai'i, H.B. No. 2057 (20 January 2006).
246 Twventy-Third Legislature, State of Hawai'i, Senate Comm. on Health, Standing Comm.
Report No. 3185 on H.B. No. 2057, H.D. 2 (31 March 2006). The Committee also noted
that many other ethnic groups in Hawai'i, including Filipinos, Chinese and Japanese, also
have practices that require burial of the placenta to protect the health of the child.
247 Tara Godvin "Hawaiians Await Bill on Access to Placenta" Honolulu Star-Bulletin (Hawai'i,
17 April 2006) <http: starbilletin. com/2006/04/17/news/story01. html> (last visited 5
November 2011).
248 Haw. Rev. Stat. 5.75(b) (2008).
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Recognising that the aloha spirit was "the working philosophy of native
Hawaiians" which was presented as a gift to the general community, Hawai'i
law defines aloha as "mutual regard and affection" with "no obligation in
return" and "the essence of relationships in which each person is important
to every other person for collective existence". 249
The PASH Court specifically cited this provision in rejecting an approach
reflecting an "unjustifiable lack of respect for gathering activities as an
acceptable cultural usage in pre-modern Hawai'i, which can also be successfully
incorporated in the context of our current culture".250 Subsequently, the Hawai'i
State Legislature, in enacting a law that broadened the requirements of an
environmental impact statement to include impacts on the cultural practices
of the community, recognised that "the native Hawaiian culture plays a vital
role" in the preservation of the "aloha spirit" and that:2"
the past failure to require native Hawaiian cultural impact assessments has
resulted in the loss and destruction of many important cultural resources and
has interfered with the exercise of native Hawaiian culture.
Hawai'i's unique history and culture have resulted in a modern society
renowned for its warmth and generosity of spirit. That spirit finds its roots in
traditional Hawaiian culture and it continues to infuse island life today, in part
because of Hawai'i's long-standing recognition and protection for Hawaiian
tradition and custom. Thus, I close this paper with the words from the Oli
Aloha as expressed in Hawai'i state law:252
Akahai, meaning kindness to be expressed with tenderness;
Lokahi, meaning unity, to be expressed with harmony;
'Olu'olu, meaning agreeable, to be expressed with pleasantness;
Ha'aha'a, meaning humility, to be expressed with modesty;
Ahonui, meaning patience, to be expressed with perseverance.
'Ano 'ai, 'ano 'ai, me ke aloha. Aloha c, aloha c, aloha e.
249 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 5.75(a) (2008). The law incorporates the words to an Oli Aloha, or chant
ofAloha- composed by Pilabi Paki, a Hawaiian chanter, composer and writer. The oli assigns
important Hawaiian cultural values to each of the letters ofAloha.
250 PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 450, 903 P2d at 1271. n. 44.
251 Act 50, Haw. Sess. Laws (2000); see Ka Pa'akai, 94 Hawai'i at 47. 7 P.3d at 1084, n. 28
(2000).
252 Haw. Rev. Stat. 5.75(a) (2008).
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